WEEK 6 - 20 November
11am-12.30pm (Seminar in the Gibson Building):
Christopher Oldfield, University of Cambridge:
‘Categorical Dualism’
Abstract: Categorical Dualism differs from Substance Dualism and from Property Dualism, by conceiving of soul and body as things of categorically different ontological types, neither one thing nor two things of one type. By the “soul” (psyche) and the “body” (soma) I have in mind two things, which hang together in some way, which I intend to be understood as a matter of ontological dependence: the soul being the activity in virtue of which some body is where they are. For all I know, it could be the activity of the material parts of somebody in virtue of which there is somebody where they are, or the activity of an incorporeal being, but it could not be one of the parts of any body, or one of its functionally higher-order properties.
The “body” (soma) need not be capable of conscious perception, rational agency, independent existence, trans-temporal stability, or psychological continuity through time in order to be, or to have a soul. Categorical Dualism is thus compatible with a range of views on the so-called “mind-body” problem, the “body” problem, whatever philosophers mean by the words “human body”, or the persistence of human persons. I present Categorical Dualism as a ‘cornerstone of commonsense’ (Simons 1987) that is immune from standard criticisms of Substance Dualism (e.g. the interaction problem) and Property Dualism (e.g. the combination problem). It marks a distinction which we make ‘effortlessly’ (Wiggins 2012) that is of enduring significance to us as embodied thinkers.
I conclude by questioning the priority of Jonathan Schaffer’s (2010) tiling constraint on individuals being in the same place at the same time, in light of David Wiggins’ (1968) remark on categories and materialism, and invite theological reflections on Jennifer Hornsby’s (2009, 2017) remarks about actions and activity, conceptual analysis and acts of faith.
Christopher Oldfield is a philosopher at King's College London, Trinity College Cambridge, and the Faraday Institute for Science and Religion. He works on foundational issues in the logic of scientific metaphysics, with special interests in the history and interpretations of "physicalism". In 2025, he will be guest editing a special issue of Scientia et Fides, with William Simpson, on ‘Why Middle Sized Matters for Science and Religion’. For details of the call for papers and more, see chrisoldfieldphilosophy.com.
